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Introduction
A significant amount of research examines the effects of finance on various aspects of real sector activity. One of the areas in which research has focused on recently is the availability of finance and exports. Many questions arise -can access to finance be a source of a country's comparative advantage?
Are exports more or less sensitive to financing availability than domestic sales? etc. The issues are equally important from a policy point of view -for example, whether a lack of proper trade finance constitutes a significant barrier to exports or not.
We add to this growing literature on finance and trade by examining the effects of financial integration on U.S. state-level exports. Specifically, we examine the evolution of exports of the 48 contiguous states of the U.S.A. to different countries as more financing becomes available following the inter-state banking deregulation in the United States in the 1990s. We exploit the exogenous nature of the removal of regulatory barriers in banking to the states' exports in manufactured goods to foreign destinations. Our identifying strategy relies on the fact that different states deregulated entry into their banking markets at different dates and to different sets of counterparty-states before the federal law made it mandatory for all the states in 1995. This interstate bank liberalization caused a consolidation of the industry and a wave of mergers in the previously closed state banking systems (see Berger et al., 1995 for an early account).
The increase in the availability of finance is also likely to trigger (endogenous) re-allocation of factors of production, firm entry and exit, and increases in productivity, or may simply be contemporaneous with (exogenous) changes in manufacturing technologies. Such effects are difficult to account for appropriately in empirical testing 1 . To get around these complications, we examine individual states' exports to different foreign countries relative to their shipments of manufactured goods to the rest of the U.S., which we label as "domestic" trade 2 . In other words, we study the effects of banking integration on openness. The use of the relative foreign-to-domestic trade ratio, a measure of openness, allows us to account for state-specific dynamics, albeit implicitly, that would otherwise make it difficult to identify the impact of a state's financial integration with the rest of the U.S. on its exports. It helps also our IV-based strategy: it is very unlikely that deregulation patterns of U.S. states could be explained by state openness patterns. Our empirical specification allows us to identify how bank integration had an impact on the relative costs of serving different (foreign and domestic) destinations (see Section 4), either through the provision of finance to overcome variable and fixed costs of exports, or through the 1 If there was a positive effect of banking integration on domestic production, for example through new firm entry, standard trade theories predict that exports would increase as well. This would have nothing to do with providing more trade finance. 2 Rerunning our base specifications on export data only shows also a statistically significant and positive link between bank integration and exports, although the estimating specification may be error-prone as discussed below.
availability of trade finance services (that may depend for example on easy access to international banking networks). However, it is difficult to discern between these two channels empirically. Our data allow us to distinguish the intensive margin, i.e., trade between existing state-country pairs, from the extensive margin, i.e., trade between new state-country pairs.
Why should tighter bank integration increase exports by more than domestic shipments? Several channels can be identified, discussed further in Section 3. Bank integration can change capital availability to firms or increase the supply of export-related services at the export location. More capital availability should allow firms to finance any variable or fixed costs of exports more easily on top of just financing production or innovation costs, and hence permits firms to serve more destinations (the extensive margin) and/or export more to old destinations (the intensive margin). Higher availability of trade finance products for potential exporters and better access to international banking networks would further reinforce the effect.
In the empirical work, we first estimate log-linear gravity equations of trade using an IV-withinestimator with origin U.S.-state and destination-country fixed-effects. Because our dataset involves zero trade flows between many U.S. state and country pairs, which may lead to potentially biased and inconsistent estimates (see Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006 for a discussion precisely in the context of trade flow estimation), we also use count-data based IV-Poisson estimators with fixed-effects. Our specification controls for many factors that are difficult to measure (such as GDP and price levels) or that are difficult to account for (such as import tariffs and nontariff barriers).
We find from our preferred estimates suggest that exports reacted more strongly than domestic shipments to banking integration: a 1% increase in banking integration leads to a 0.164-0.184% increase in the exports/domestic shipments ratio in our sample. This means that, if an integration of a state would increase from 23% --the average for the 48 states in the sample in 1991 --to 31.1% in 1995 (a 35% increase in integration), openness should increase by 5.77-6.48% in the same time due to a higher provision of trade services and capital for covering variable and fixed costs. Given the interpretation of our dependent variable and the estimation specification we use, our findings are consistent with Matsuyama's (2007) prediction that an exogenous increase in factors that are extensively used in exports (in our case, the provision of export-specific services) would increase openness. The extensive margin of trade (defined in our case as state-level trade to new countries) accounts for at least 22% to 28% of the banking integration effect that we observe. This means that the increase in banking integration allowed to start new trade relationships between some states and countries.
This article is related with the growing literature on finance and trade. An important and distinctive trait of the paper is that we can sidestep the endogeneity problems that are inherent in this line of research irrespective of whether aggregate (e.g., Manova, 2008b) or firm-level data are used (e.g., Greenaway et al., 2007) . For papers based on country-level data, countries' financial depths may not be exogenous to their global trade flows as pointed out by Do and Levchenko (2007) : the export financing needs of firms can cause a deeper financial system to develop. In contrast, in our case the change in the states' domestic financial integration with the rest of the U.S. is exogenous to their exports to foreign countries. For papers based on firm-level data the endogeneity problem is entangled with productivity: it may be that more productive firms export more, which allows them to grow faster and access financial capital more easily; or that productive firms are more likely to get financing, which in turns makes it more likely that they export. Moreover, individual firms' export decisions require the modeling of the endogenous self-selection process, something which is difficult because it depends on many firm characteristics that cannot be readily observed. Our research differs from the existing papers in both areas as we examine whether a state's exports to other countries increase relative to its domestic shipments (domestic trade) when an exogenous event makes bank financing more available for that state as opposed to other states. In other words, we examine a state's export of manufactured goods to foreign destinations over and above its domestic trade with the rest of the U.S., once that same state's banking sector opens up to banks from other states. We view our contribution as complementary to that of Amiti and Weinstein (2009) and Minetti and Zhu (2011) , the only papers that attempt to identify the effect of bank intermediation on firm-level exports for Japanese and Italian data, respectively.
Post-"Great Recession", a new line of research started to examine whether the shocks to the financial sector are responsible for the large drops in the exports/GDP ratios, something that may have exacerbated the slowdown of economic activity during the crisis (for example, Amiti and Weinstein 2009, and Kortum et al., 2010) . Our paper is also related to this literature, which focuses on the provision of bank capital, since we examine how exports are affected from positive shocks emanating from the integration of a state's banking system with the rest of the U.S. The staggered deregulatory processes that we use to identify the effect of financial integration on trade may provide an alternative to the testing of the same question. Our results show that the stronger responses of international trade to domestic shipments may be due to both changes in the provision of capital or changes in banking integration.
Finally, the paper contributes to the sizeable literature of the effects of the U.S. banking deregulation on real activity (see, for example, Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996; Black and Strahan, 2002; and Kerr and Nanda 2009) . The finding that bank integration affected exports more than domestic shipments is of interest in itself, and we indirectly identify another benefit of the U.S. deregulation experiment -the attenuation of trade finance related barriers.
The structure of the U.S. banking industry at the beginning of the 1990s and the profound transformation it was undergoing at the time leads us to believe that banking deregulation in the U.S. is a compelling natural experiment that can be used to study the increase in the supply of finance for both production and export purposes. At the beginning of 1990s, there were few U.S. banks (15-20) that were engaged strongly in international trade finance out of the fragmented industry of 12000 institutions (American Banker, 1992) 3 . Many of the banks requested additionally government guarantees to provide trade finance products.
The way trade finance was provided in the U.S. was rapidly changing at the beginning of the 1990s, shaped by two factors --the ongoing banking deregulation and technological changes in the provision of trade finance products. Interstate banking deregulation that occurred in the U.S. between 1978 and 1995 allowed the creation of regional and "superregional" banks --networks of financial institutions that were controlled by multibank holding companies (MBHCs). These banks, because of their size could offer more complex services and hence a greater product mix -including trade financethat banks with only a local presence could not, placing the latter at a disadvantage (American Banker 1996 , World Trade 1995 . This was because small organizations either did not have the required capital base, the expertise (with some trade finance arrangements requiring extensive legal know-how) or the network of correspondent banks and/or overseas branches (see Austin American-Statesman 1996 , American Banker 1994 , Chicago Sun-Times 1994 . Therefore, for local businesses, the arrival of interstate organizations may have made trade finance more affordable and available, especially for small exporters. Because regional banks were located "close to the customer" they had an advantage over money center banks (located in New York, San Francisco, etc.), which were traditional purveyors of trade finance, in terms of speed and quality of service (World Trade 1995) . Non-money center "regionals" and "superregionals" were also more readily serving midsize companies as they wanted to become one-stop shops for their clients, whereas the large money center banks were typically interested in large transactions.
Technological and product advances --both in the U.S. and globally --also changed the provision of trade finance. Computerization of operations allowed to lower the costs of origination, preparation of the legal documents needed for different products, the conduct of transactions and the tracking of the payments' status by customers. Firms could originate trade finance products from a distance from their own PC-based systems. As such procedures became more standardized the provision of trade finance products started to have economies of scale. On the product innovation side, securitization allowed banks to avoid the country risk limits that banks could take (American Banker, 1996) . These changes favored large organizations --which were being created as a result of interstate mergers --to obtain more of the trade finance business. To cater to their clients, for example as a result of NAFTA, some banks went to acquire foreign operations, for example in Mexico (U.S. Banker, 1995) . However, many large banks, instead of creating their own networks, entered into alliances with foreign partners to provide letters of credit and other trade finance products (American Banker, 1996 , U.S. Banker 1993 .
The paper is constructed as follows. In Section 2 we review the current literature on trade and finance. In Section 3 we sketch the effect of banking integration on the ability of firms to export. In Section 4 we present the empirical specification and discuss the data at our disposal. Section 5 discusses the results and Section 6 concludes.
Literature Review
This paper is related to the growing body of research on trade intermediation in general -the role of networks, wholesalers, specialized traders in international trade (see for example, Rauch, 2001 , Feenstra and Hanson, 2004 , Ahn et al., 2009 , and Blum et al., 2009 , Antras and Costinot, 2010 . In contrast to these papers we focus on the role financial intermediation in trade, which is a nascent area of research. Most of the papers in this new research area make use of firm-level data to examine the role of bank financing on exports. For example, Amiti and Weinstein (2009) identify main-banks providing trade finance services to major Japanese companies (for each company it is either the bank that handles most firm transactions or the most important commercial bank if the former is a regional bank) and relate mainbank financial health to client-firm export activity. Their story is inherently about capital provision: they find a positive impact of bank health on exports in Japan. While very interesting and clever in its approach, Amiti and Weinstein (2009) also leave certain questions unanswered. For example, these authors cannot observe the destinations served, and as a result can only evaluate the effects of main-bank health on the intensive margin, but not on the extensive margin. Moreover, adverse bank health (as measured by stock valuations in their study) may be caused by expected bad performance of their borrowers in the first place. Amiti and Weinstein (2009) focus on the largest Japanese firms may be underestimating the total effects of bank health on exports, even if their sample accounts for approximately 80% of Japanese exports, as it is the small-and medium-sized firms that rely on banks the most for their financing needs. In another interesting paper, Minetti and Zhu (2011) study a survey of Italian firms that detailed their export participation and potential credit constraints in year 2000. They use as instruments historical Italian banking regulations that limited the provision of banking services on a regional basis and find a statistically significant effect of credit constraints on firm-level exports. Given their data, Minetti and Zhu (2011) can study the intensive as well as the extensive margin at the firm level, but cannot control for many unobservables in a one-year cross-section. Endogeneity is an important problem in this literature, and despite best efforts Minetti and Zhu (2011) Minetti and Zhu (2011) . Fourth, we are able to work with panel data, albeit short ones using two different data series (4 or 5 years), which allow us to study the dynamic effects of banking integration on exports (as opposed to, for example, Minetti and Zhu (2011) that relies on cross-section data linked to a survey). As such, we do not expect firms to change their location in response to changes in financial integration over such a short panel (which may be an issue in Minetti and Zhu, 2011 Minetti and Zhu (2011) .
In some respects our work is related to Michalski and Ors (2010) , who treat the U.S. inter-state banking deregulation as a natural experiment as we do, and find that higher banking integration between U.S. states led to higher trade between them. In their case, state pairs that experienced an increase in banking integration from zero to the sample mean had their common trade increased by 11%-25%, a result that could provide a lower bound estimate for the trade effects of international bank integration.
The focus on international exports in this paper differs from Michalski and Ors (2010) Svaleryd and Vlachos (2005) find that among OECD countries (i) differences in financial development impact industrial specialization patterns; and (ii) a well-developed financial system is a source of comparative advantage. Becker and Greenberg (2003) find that financial development helps the exports more in industrial sectors with large up-front investments. However, the causality between the availability of finance and trade remains difficult to resolve. As Do and Levchenko (2007) show, using geography as an instrument for trade flows in a cross-country study, the relationship between financial depth and trade may go the other way: a comparative advantage for a country in financially dependent industries appears to spur the development of its financial sector.
Our work differs from the last set of papers as we focus on the effects of the financial integration between regions, as opposed to financial system depth in a given country, on trade flows. The two need not be equal. First, financial depth, which is typically measured as the ratio of banking assets to GDP, may not fully reflect the provision of loanable funds, which can be transferred across different units of a multi-state or -country banking organization. Second, financial depth may not be the best measure to account for the provision of trade-related financial services, which may depend more on the presence of large out-of-state or -country banks and trade-specialist banking organization. We would argue that measures of financial integration, such as the share of out-of-state banks, may be more useful when trying to differentiate the effect of higher capital provision from that of more trade-related services provision.
From this perspective, the inter-state banking entry deregulation in the U.S. offers a compelling natural experiment to study the impact of financial integration on exports. Using changes in financial integration in this setting should go a long way to solve the problem of endogeneity posed by Do and Levchenko (2007) . Moreover, U.S. states share a common legal background, and the banks operate in a common federal structure of supervision and regulation. U.S. exporters from different states face the same political and economic risks and have access to the same export support programs through the Export-Import Bank of the United States (U.S. ExIm Bank) or private lenders such as Private Export Funding Corporation (PEFCO). Therefore, the possibility that country-specific factors (either at the origin or at the destination)
will be driving the results is lower in our case than in typical cross-country investigations.
Our work is also linked to the growing research on financial or liquidity constraints and exports.
Chaney (2005) builds a theory model in which liquidity constraints affect's firms' ability to export. Greenaway, Guariglia and Kneller (2007) show evidence that exporting firms are financially healthier than non-exporting firms. They also find that firms that start to export have lower liquidity and higher leverage, suggesting that these firms are more likely to need bank financing. Zia (2008) studies the withdrawal of export subsidies to Pakistani firms, and finds that exports of financially constrained firms decrease, whereas those of non-constrained firms do not. Similarly, Ronci (2004) finds that a fall in trade financing that corresponds to a domestic banking crisis leads to significantly lower exports. Suwantaradon borrowed from suppliers or lent to buyers) during the credit crunch in Asia; they find inter alia that export intensive firms did not use trade credit and their sales declined more strongly than for non-exporting firms.
Our state-country level data combined with the inter-state banking deregulation as a natural experiment may help overcome the inherent endogeneity problems that is inherent in all papers based on firm level data. For example, it may be that more productive firms are more likely to export and at the same time such firms may also have better access to capital. It may also be that banks select to lend to more productive firms, which helps the latter to export more easily. Moreover, individual firms' export decisions require additional modeling of the self-selection process to export goods, something that depends on many unobservables and for which there are few good exogenous (instrumental) variables.
We are also able to account for the extensive margin of trade that some of the aforementioned papers cannot.
Given our identification strategy (see Section 4.2.2), our paper is also related to the recent contributions trying to explain the fall in trade to GDP ratio during the 2008-2009 crisis (Chor and Manova, 2009 , Amiti and Weinstein, 2009 , Levchenko et al., 2010 , Kortum et al., 2010 . Chor and Manova (2009) document that the fall in U.S. imports during the crisis was larger for countries and sectors with adverse credit conditions. According to Amiti and Weinstein (2009) On the other hand, there is some evidence that U.S. banking deregulation reduces lending rates (e.g., Rice and Strahan, 2010) . If bank deregulation is followed by decreases in the cost of trade related services, we may observe an increase in the foreign exports to domestic shipments ratio. To our knowledge no paper so far studied the effects of U.S. banking deregulation on U.S. export activity.
Links to Standard Theories of Trade
Various models of international trade --those based on increasing returns with homogenous ( 1) where, N i is the number of firms in the sector at location i, I j is the income at destination j, P j is the price level, ψ ij is the (constant) marginal cost of serving destination j from location i, Γ ij is a collection of parameters that contain, inter alia, variable and fixed costs of exporting to the destination j. The assumption on the other parameters is that η>0 and φ>0.
In this general set-up, banking integration can affect exports from a region through several channels. The working of these channels can be summarized by whether bank integration changes capital availability to firms or increases the supply of export-related services at the export location (in our case, the state). A good discussion is provided in Amiti and Weinstein (2009).
The effect of bank integration on exports through changes in capital availability is similar to that identified by the finance and growth literature on domestic output and will not be extensively reviewed
here. For example, higher banking competition as a result of new bank entry can lead to lower financial barriers to firm entry and affect the number of firms entering the sector N i (see evidence in Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006) , the costs of lending to firms (see a discussion in Rice and Strahan, 2010 ) -so directly the marginal cost of production ψ ij . Arguments can be advanced as to why loosening of credit constraints or cheaper cost of borrowing by firms could affect exports more strongly than production for the domestic market. Export transactions require typically more working capital due to the fact that there are higher upfront costs and that payment settlement on international contracts typically is much longer than on domestic ones (see discussions in Amiti and Weinstein, 2009, and Manova et al., 2009) . Moreover, exporting is a more risky activity than shipping domestically. For export activity, a higher availability of capital and lower credit constraints can also affect the variable and fixed exports costs captured succinctly in expression (1) by Γ ij (see Manova 2008b for further discussion).
The other important channel through which banking integration may affect exports is the provision of export-supporting financial services. An exogenous increase in such services would lead, for example as discussed by Matsuyama (2007) have also more precise information on the probability of counterparty survival (the contractual risk) that is crucial in contracting. Second, banks may play a crucial role in safeguarding and enforcing payments in international contracts. A firm that has a one-time export contract may find payment enforcement problematic in the absence of banks. This is because the costs of payment enforcement -for example fixed costs of a legal action in a foreign country -may be too large for the contract to be profitable if the importer reneges on payments. A potential solution to the problem is the usage of the banking systems in the exporter and importer country to process payments, and there is a wide variety of different types of contracts serving this purpose in practice (see for example Grath, 2010 for a description). Larger banks, created in the process of banking integration, may enter in relationships with correspondent banks in other countries more easily and find it therefore easier to enforce payments or go after recalcitrant payers in other countries. There may be economies of scale and scope in these activities. The arrival of these large banks in under-banked areas may lower the cost of accessing the export-supporting activities for a potential exporter, thus directly affecting Γ ij . Given the existence of these channels and their effects, we expect that banking integration in the U.S. would have a larger impact on exports relative to domestic shipments.
The Empirical Model and Data

The Empirical Specifications
For our analysis we need to match the above-mentioned theoretical considerations with the available state-to-country level trade data. We have aggregate export data from individual U.S. states (denoted i) to foreign country j (FEXPORTS i,j ), but unfortunately we cannot observe the firm-level production or export data. Theoretically this is not a problem as modern trade models relate the expected exports to destination-specific demand and trade barriers (including variable and fixed costs of trade).
Moreover, the domestic market can be treated as the destination that has the lowest (possibly zero) trade barriers. Hence, by applying a proper empirical strategy, we can overcome the difficulty that we do not observe the exact number of exporters to a given destination. In fact, as firms may be created for a variety of reasons, we eliminate the number of firms from consideration altogether. This will allow us to use only the total state production (in the aggregate or in groups of sectors) and the exports to foreign destinations.
To counter any potential effect of firm creation we use the ratio between exports and domestic U.S.
shipments (calculated as the difference between total shipments and total exports). This approach allows us also, as described below, to counter any differential cross-state changes in production factor costs that could potentially occur because of banking integration.
The ratio of the exports from state i to foreign country j to the shipments to destination k (in our case the domestic U.S. market) at time t given equation (1) is:
Taking logarithms, and simplifying (2) we obtain (notice that the number of firms N it cancels out 4 ):
where,
We stipulate that at time t, T ijt can be modeled as: (4) where, ψ it is the marginal cost of production, d ij is the (time-invariant) trade barrier between i and j (e.g., distance), d t is the yearly barrier (e.g. general transport costs in a given year), d jt is the time-varying general destination trade barrier (e.g., a general level of tariffs at the destination), d i is any barrier that may be specific to the exporting U.S. state (e.g. access to a deepwater port) and Φ are invariable parameters.
While looking at the behavior of the ratios, notice that a cost factor like wages or interest rates (which are a part of ψ it ) is going to cancel-out in this expression since it is the same for both exports and domestic shipments to k. Therefore, any changes in factor prices in states will not have any effect on this ratio (as long as the marginal costs of producing the same product for the domestic and foreign markets are the same i.e., the changes in the relative trade barriers (e.g., the higher provision of trade-related financial services).
The resulting empirical specification in the log-linear form is (where destination k is the rest of the U.S., i.e., the "domestic" market):
where, γ i is the state dummy, γ t is the year dummy, γ jt is a destination-time dummy, γ ij and γ ik are the statedestination dummies and ε is the error term. Given that the base in terms of the destination (k) -the home market, the entire U.S. -always remains constant, 5 there is no need for including base destination year dummies γ kt , which would be equivalent to γ t . The time-invariant dummies γ i , γ ij and γ ik are all going to be absorbed by fixed effects inherent in our estimators. The year-effects, γ t , filter out any general (across-theboard increases in U.S. exports) and base-destination related (i.e., domestic U.S.) income, price level and general trade barriers. Destination income, price levels, free trade agreements (FTAs) with the U.S., general tariff level, political risk and any trade barriers such as wars are captured by the destination-year dummy γ jt . It should be noted that the state-country pair fixed-effect γ ij would account for the presence of country j's banks in state i throughout the sample period, whereas the time-varying destination-country effect γ jt would control for entry by country j's banks into the U.S. banking market.
The variable of interest Z it is a measure of banking integration with the rest of the U.S. for a given state i across time t. It is clear that β may be positive if, for a given state the change (fall) in export costs is higher than that of serving domestic destinations. On the other hand, if banking integration leads to more funding at a lower cost for domestic flows, β may well be negative. Given our empirical specification, β would capture the effect of higher capital provision as well as more trade-related services by banks.
Data
Trade and production data
To estimate the impact of financial integration on exports, we combine information from various sources to build our database. We obtain state-level U.S. export data from the Federal Trade Division (FTD) of the Census Bureau of the U.S. The data come from the Shipper's Export Declaration (SED) forms that all exporters have to file. The data were collected starting with 1992 by state and by industry sector at the two-digit SIC code level. The SED forms contain three location-related fields in which the exporter is asked to provide (i) U.S. state of origin of the shipment, (ii) the ZIP-code of the location of the exporter, and (iii) the foreign country to which exports are shipped. FTD obtains two different datasets depending on whether the data aggregation at the state level is done using the exporter provided (i) USstate or (ii) ZIP-code information, which results in the Origin of Movement (OM) data and the Exporter Location (EL) data, respectively. There are two main reasons why the US-state information for the originator of the exports need not match the US-state information contained in the ZIP-code for the export location. First, multi-plant firms could report their headquarters' address in the ZIP-code field in the SED form and fill-in the U.S.-state code of the plant that manufactured the products that are being exported.
Second, the exporters may be wholesalers rather than producers, in which case they could provide the ZIP-code information for their firm and the U.S. state-code information for the actual manufacturer.
6
According to surveys conducted by the FTD, the data provided by producers tend to reflect plant or establishment location rather than firm headquarters. In any case, it is unclear which type of data would be more accurate in matching exports with their "actual" or "primary" origin. As a result, we use both datasets.
7
We apply a number of exclusion rules to obtain our final databases. 
Inter-state banking deregulation and bank-entry data
We use standard and publicly available U.S. data sources to create our banking integration (our endogenous and instrumented test variable) and inter-state banking deregulation variables (our exogenous instruments). To calculate a measure of banking systems' integration of a state with the rest of the U.S.
banking system, we use data from the Summary of Deposits (SoD) dataset, in which all U.S. banks have to report their branch-level total deposits as of end-of-June of each year to the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation. We use branch-level deposits data because after 1994 it became more difficult to account for out-of-banking organizations' deposits, loans, or total assets using bank-level balance sheet data from the (Kane, 1996, and Kroszner and Strahan, 1999) . The main economic arguments advanced for the deregulation process to occur was to allow banks to have asset and deposit diversification, increase competition in banking markets so as to improve customer services and loan availability and to let banks exploit economies of scale and scope in back office operations. In practice, according to existing research, deregulation was driven by the importance of lobbying groups such as small banks that were against deregulation for fear of loss of local market power, insurance companies that opposed banks' sale of insurance products at their expense, and small businesses that were for deregulation in order to access cheaper financing (Kroszner and Strahan, 1999) . Kane (1996) further argues that the bank and thrift (i.e., savings and loans) failures, which occurred in separate waves in different regions due to different economic shocks, were important triggers of financial deregulation. The concept of regional bank-opening was prevalent among the states during the earlier period of deregulation; states (and pressure groups) typically feared an unconditional opening of their banking systems would lead to acquisitions by large money-center banks. One idea behind regional liberalization of inter-state banking was that such deregulation would lead to a creation of regional banks that, in the event of a nationwide deregulation, would be strong enough to compete with these money-center banks. If anything, then, this would be against exporter interests: they would like the money-center banks (traditional providers of trade finance at the time) to locate near them and offer trade services cheaper and more quickly.
We collect inter-state banking entry deregulation dates from Amel (2000) that are the basis for constructing our banking integration instruments, for which we adapt the ones used in Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004) BANK_INTEGRATION) ), which is also lagged by one year with respect to the dependent variable of our IV-regressions (ln(FEXPORTS/DSHIPMENTS)).
Other variables
We also rely on the following variables in some of the specifications in which the large number of indicator variables becomes computationally costly. We use country GDP levels (adjusted for purchasing power parity or PPP), ln(DESTINATION_GDP), taken from the Penn World Tables (version   6. 3), to account for destination country's income and purchasing power. We expect this variable's coefficient estimate to be close to positive one, in line with the gravity model estimates in the literature.
We use the logarithm of the "great-circle" distance between the capital cities for each state-country pair to account for trade barriers. Geographical variables for state-country distance calculations are taken from CEPII datasets. We expect the coefficient estimate of ln(DISTANCE) to be between -0.5 and -1.0, again in line with the gravity equation estimates in the international trade literature. 12 We control for the free trade agreements (D_FTA) between the U.S. and countries with an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if such an agreement is in place in a given year, or zero otherwise. This "dummy" controls in particular for the NAFTA that entered into force in 1994, as the United States did not enter into any other trade agreements in the time period we study. The free-trade agreements already in place would be absorbed by country fixed-effects. D_CLS_LIMITS indicator variable controls for the potential credit constraints while exporting to a given destination country: it is equal to 1 if the U.S. ExIm Bank has any restrictions, as published in the Bank's Country Limitation Schedules (CLS), on lending for or 10 A natural alternative would have been to use the logarithm of the years since deregulation, which we rule out as some states, such as Kansas and Montana, deregulated for the first-time during our sample years, and hence had zeros in our dataset for the years preceding their very-first deregulation. 11 In this we follow Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004) : lagging allows for bank mergers and acquisitions, through which banking integration proceeded, to start to take place (see their footnote 10 on page 1565). 12 For Canada and Mexico, we use state-to-nearest-provincial capital distances, even though exports number remain at the U.S.-state to Canada or Mexico (i.e., at the country) level.
guaranteeing lending for export transactions to a given country, and zero otherwise. We use this particular measure in lieu of other ones (such as sovereign credit ratings or Institutional Investor country credit ratings) for numerous reasons. First, the U.S. ExIm Bank limitation schedules directly pertain to trade transactions and those directly from the United States, taking into account not only economic but also political risk relevant to U.S. companies. Second, country limitations would affect the lending of private banks for trade transactions either by restricting credit directly or indicating the riskiness of a transaction to the market. Lastly, CLS limits is available for a wider number of countries (all of which are in our sample) than the alternatives cited above.
Summary statistics
The summary statistics for our datasets are presented in Table 1 . The average ratio of exports (to one destination) to domestic shipments is small: 0.08% in the case of OM and EL data. The minimum is zero, which means that no trade took place between some states and some countries in some years. The maximum is 56.64% for the OM data (which means that exports to one destination were more than 50% of domestic shipments) and 52.23% for the EL data. This is a rather rare case of Vermont (a small border state) in 1993 for its exports to Canada.
On average, the typical destination country has a GDP of 16.7 billion (=e 16.63156 ) U.S. dollars (international-PPP adjusted), and is 8,393 (=e 9.0351 ) kilometers away from the typical state's capital. The number of constrained countries in terms of export lending at one point or the other is 74 or 50% of all destinations. This somewhat large number is due to the fact that our dataset covers 148 countries, many of them small emerging economies. As a result, for 44.6% of the observations D_CLS_LIMITS, which captures whether export lending to a particular destination by the ExIm Bank was constrained in a given year, takes on the value of 1. There is one country -Israel -with which the USA has a free trade agreement at the beginning of the sample (which is captured by the fixed-or time-varying country effect).
After the creation of NAFTA in 1994, Canada and Mexico are the other two countries with which the US has such an agreement.
There is a lot of variation in the variable measuring bank integration, BANK_INTEGRATION, Michigan to Canada in 1996. There is a great variation in the data in terms of the served countries by the states, as pictured by the number of years each destination is served (shown in Figure 1 ). In the the OM (EL) data 66.13% (68.14%) of countries are served by exports for all the years the data are available, while 9.85% (11.19%) of state-country pairs never experience exports in the OM (EL) data. 13 There are a non-trivial number of state-country pairs that do not trade all the time, something we account for in our empirical work.
Results
Our results consist of three sets of empirical model estimates. First, we estimate log-linear gravity equations of foreign exports-to-domestic shipments and present the results in Tables 2 and 3 . Second,
given the various deficiencies of log-linear gravity models (to be discussed in detail further below), we estimate various Poisson regression models and present their results in Tables 4 and 5 . Third, and finally, we re-estimate our preferred Poisson regression model capital-versus non-capital-intensive industry sectors to explore sub-sample-level variation in our data and report the results in Table 6 .
Log-linear gravity equation models
We estimate the following empirical gravity equation in the log-linear form:
where, D_Y t are year fixed-effects, D_S&C i,j are origin state-and-country of destination pair fixed-effects, D_Y&C j,t are time-varying destination country fixed-effects. Note that, while simple, this specification soaks up all of the variation in the dependent variable, except in the i and t dimension: if we were to include year-varying indicator variables for states' that are the origins of exports, there would be no more variation left to be explained in the dependent variable. Our dummies take care thus of such important trade flow determinants as destination GDP and price level, physical distance to the destination, the general level of tariffs at the destination, cultural proximity etc. The coefficient β measures the percentage change in the foreign exports to domestic shipments ratio (FEXPORTS/DSHIPMENTS i,j,t ) for a given change in the lagged bank integration for state i (L1.ln (BANK_INTEGRATION i,t ) ). The latter is proxied by the one-year lagged market share of out-of-state banks in state i in year t. We estimate the empirical equation (6) first using a Within estimator and second using Instrumental Variables-Fixed Effects regression with a 2-Stage General Method of Moments (IV-FE-2SGMM) estimator, for both the OM and the EL data. We check for the success of our identification strategy by conducting standard under-, weakand over-identification tests, for which we report the results at the bottom of our tables whenever possible.
In Table 2 , we report the estimates for the log-linear model using the "full" samples of OM and EL data: these samples exclude the cases of zero exports from certain states to certain countries (a point to which we will come back to in Section 5.2). The results of the log-linear Within model with the OM data are presented in column (1): the coefficient estimate for bank integration is -0.0140, which is not significant statistically. If bank integration were endogenous to state's industrial production, which may be the case even when it is lagged in case it is persistent over time, these estimates would be biased and inconsistent (see for example, Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 96) . In column (2), the IV-estimate for β is 0.0970, which is statistically significant at the 10%-level: one percent increase in banking integration (as measured by the market share of out-of-state banks) would increase foreign exports by almost 0.10% over-and-above the increase in domestic shipments, a 1/10 th increase.
To check the validity of our IV-estimation, we conduct a series of identification tests, which are presented at the bottom of column (2) of Table 2 . First, the under-identification test strongly rejects (at the 1% level) the null hypothesis that our model is under-identified. The result of this test indicates that the rank condition necessary and sufficient for identification of our model is satisfied. However, the rejection of under-identification test does not rule out the problem of weak instruments, which we test for in a second step. It should be noted that with valid instruments IV-estimates are asymptotically consistent but inevitably biased in finite samples (see, for example, Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p.108 ). The question is whether the IV bias is at a tolerable level, such as 5% or 10% of the OLS bias. The weakidentification test rejects the null hypothesis of weak instruments with a Stock and Yogo (2005) critical value that corresponds to a 10%-level. This critical threshold value suggests that the finite-sample bias of the IV estimate is in the lowest range. Finally, in the over-identification test we check for the validity of over-identifying restrictions of our model. The underlying joint-null hypothesis is that our instruments are valid and that the exclusion restrictions imposed on the instruments are correct. The reported Hansen-J statistic cannot reject the null, validating the over-identifying restrictions imposed on the model. The results of these tests suggest that our empirical model is properly identified, does not suffer from the weak instruments problem, and has a minimal finite-sample IV bias compared to the OLS bias.
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 , we revisit the same model with EL data, and find similar results: the coefficient estimate for L1.ln (BANK_INTEGRATION i,t ) is equal to -0.0043, which is not statistically significant, in the Within regression of column (3); but it is equal to 0.1080, albeit statistically significant at the 10%-level, in the IV-FE-2SGMM regression. One caveat for the latter estimate is that, even though we reject the under-identification and weak-identification tests as we should, we also reject the over-identification test, even if marginally at the 10%-level: the marginal rejection of the Hansen Jtest may suggest that either our set of instruments are not valid and/or that the exclusion restrictions are not valid in the particular case of the "full" sample EL data.
14 These coefficient estimates indicate a given increase in banking integration would increase the state-level exports to foreign destinations by approximately 1/10 th of that amount. However, the estimates for β include both the effects of the intensive margin (if one were to define it changes in exports to existing countries) and the extensive (if one were to define it as changes in destinations served by states).
In Table 3 we focus on the intensive margin, as defined above, by re-estimation specification (6) for the "square panels", i.e., for state-country pairs with non-zero exports in all years of OM or EL data (which correspond to 66% to 68% of the OM and EL data, respectively). Our results are consistent with those of the unbalanced panel in Table 2 . The Within estimate of β, which is potentially biased and inconsistent, is equal to -0.0121 for the OM data (column (1)) and to -0.0134 for the EL data (column (3)) with neither estimate being statistically significant. The IV-estimate of β is equal to 0.0938 for the OM data (column (2)) and to 0.1007 for the EL data (column (4)), both of which are statistically significant at the 10%-level. In both cases our tests reject both under-and weak-identification tests, but cannot reject the overidentification tests: our identification strategy appears to work, allowing us to obtain consistent estimates that are only marginally biased (given that all IV estimates are biased to a degree). We also observe that our square-panel IV-estimates of Table 3 , which are exclusive of the extensive margin effects at the statecountry level, are very similar to the corresponding estimates with the "full" sample in Table 2 : the IVestimate of β with OM data is equal to 0.0938 in Table 3 compared to 0.0970 in Table 2 , whereas the same estimate with EL data is equal to 0.1007 in Table 3 compared to 0.1080 in Table 2 . What may be driving these similar estimates is the fact that the "full" sample in the log-linear case excludes zero export data observations: the results in Table 2 , which include both the effects of the intensive and the extensive margins at the state-country level, incorporate very little, if any, of the latter given that changes from zero export levels are excluded from the "full" sample.
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) point out that OLS estimates of log-linear models would lead to potentially biased and inconsistent estimates for at least two reasons. First, as noted above, the log-linear specification does not consider information contained in zero export-to-domestic shipments that we observe in the data for certain state-country pairs. This would lead to biased gravity equation estimates. Second, as pointed out in Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) , the Jensen's inequality inherent in log-linear specifications (the expected value of a logged variable not being equal to the logarithm of the expected value) engenders a systematic heteroskedasticity problem that would lead to inconsistent OLS estimates. We follow these authors' suggestion and estimate Poisson regressions to get around these problems and obtain consistent and unbiased estimates.
Poisson regression models
However, we face a number of problems in estimating specification (6) with IV regressions in a Poisson setting. First, while we can use a Within-Poisson estimator, there is no equivalent of a IV-FE-2SGMM estimator for Poisson. The best we can do is to use an IV-Poisson estimator and add indicator variables for the various sets of fixed-effects. Unfortunately, this pragmatic solution is very costly in terms of computational requirements given that we would like to add 7,700 indicator variables for the OM data (7,551 for the EL data) to account for all the fixed effects in (6): up to 4 for year-effects plus 48×148
state-country pair fixed effects plus up to 148×4 country-year fixed effects, depending on data we use. To reduce the computational burden, we chose to estimate a gravity equation specification with only separate year-, state-, and country-fixed-effects, which reduces the number of indicator variables down to a manageable 200 (=4+48+148), by adding other variables that vary by state-and-country, country-and-year as well as time:
where, D_Y t are year t fixed-effects; D_S i are origin-state fixed-effects for state i; D_C j are destinationcountry j fixed-effects; ln(GDP_DESTINATION j,t ) is the the logarithm of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the destination country adjusted by international purchasing price parity (PPP) 15 ;
ln (DISTANCE i,j ) is the distance between state and country capitals; D_FTA i,j,t is an indicator variable that equals 1 if there is a free trade agreement between the U.S. and country j in year t, and 0 otherwise; and D_CLS_LIMITS j,t is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the U.S. ExIm Bank imposes credit or loan guarantee limits on country j in year t, and 0 otherwise. In IV-Poisson regressions for (7) L1.ln(BANK_INTEGRATION i,t ) is instrumented the same way as in (6).
Before we proceed to estimate (7) with IV-Poisson, we first check whether we obtain similar coefficient estimates for β in (6) using a Within-Poisson estimator and (7) using a Poisson estimator with 200 indicator variables. The results are presented in Table 4 , columns (1) and (2) for OM data: the estimate for β is 0.0599 (statistically significant at the 5%-level) in (6) and 0.0690 (statistically significant at the 5%-level) in (7). We also obtain similar results for EL data (presented in columns (4) and (5) of Table 4 ): the estimate for β is 0.0549 (statistically significant at the 10%-level) in (6) and 0.0581
(statistically significant at the 10%-level) in (7). The similarity of the β estimates gives us comfort that the variables we added in (7) to replace the state-country-pair and the year-varying-country "dummies" in (6), do a proper job at soaking-up the variation in the same dimensions. Moreover, the coefficient estimates for ln(GDP_DESTINATION j,t ) and ln(DISTANCE i,j ) are along the lines found in the empirical international trade literature: in Table 4 the coefficient estimate for ln (GDP_DESTINATION j,t ) is close to +1 (1.1890 and 1.2159 in columns (2) and (3) for OM data, 0.8559 and 0.8761 in columns (5) and (6) for EL data, respectively, all of which are statistically significant at the 1%-level); whereas the coefficient estimate for ln (DISTANCE i,j ) is close to -1 (-0.8940, -0.8912, -0.8416, and -0.8383 in columns (2), (3), (5) and (6), respectively, all statistically significant at the 1%-level). The D_FTA i,j,t and D_CLS_LIMITS j,t variables perform less well. The coefficient estimates for D_FTA i,j,t are unexpectedly negative but statistically insignificant, whereas the coefficient estimates for D_CLS_LIMITS j,t have the expected negative sign but are not statistically significant either.
Next, we turn our attention to estimates of β in (7), which are estimated with Poisson and IVPoisson estimators using the full-sample and are presented in Table 4 . We compare them with the estimates of β in (6), which are estimated with Within and IV-FE-2SGMM estimators using unbalancedpanel of non-zero export observations (the "full" sample in the log-linear case) and are presented in Table   2 . First, using OM data, we note that while the estimate for β in (6) using Within-OLS estimator is equal to -0.0045 and statistically insignificant (column (1) of Table 2 ), its (7) counterpart in column (2) of Table   4 is equal to 0.0690 and statistically significant at the 5%-level.
More importantly, the result in column (3) of Table 4 suggests that the estimate for β when L1.ln (BANK_INTEGRATION i,t ) is instrumented is equal to 0.1846 (statistically significant at the 1%-level). In other words, a 1% increase in banking integration (i.e., as proxied by a 1% increase in the market share of out-of-state banks) leads to a 0.1846% increase in exports over-and-above domestic shipments to the rest of the U.S. Doing the same exercise with the EL data, in the last two columns of Table 4 we observe a coefficient estimate of 0.0581 (statistically significant at the 10%-level) for the noninstrumented L1.ln (BANK_INTEGRATION i,t ) and an IV-estimate of 0.1644 (statistically significant at the 5%-level) compared to -0.0043 (statistically insignificant) and 0.1080 (statistically significant at 10%-level) in the last two columns of Table 2 .
We draw a number of conclusions from these results. First, log-linear models, even the ones estimated with IV-FE-2SGMM, under-estimate the impact of bank integration. Dropping the observations in which trade between certain state-country pairs is zero biases the estimates downwards: we observe less of an impact for bank integration given that some of the larger changes in exports that would be due to increases with respect to zero are ignored in a log-linear setting. Moreover, log-linear estimates (even when estimated with IV-methods), are likely to be inconsistent (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) .
Second, the measured impact of banking integration varies very little irrespective of whether the estimate is obtained from OM or EL data. In Table 4 the IV-Poisson estimates for β differ by 0.0202, in Table 2 by 0.0110. This suggests that the differences in the construction of the OM and EL data, which are due to differences in aggregation methods based on two different location fields in the SED forms, make little difference, despite the fact the EL data have one less year of observations than the OM data.
In Table 5 , in order to focus on intensive margin alone, we revisit regressions of equation (7) using the square-panel of state-country pairs that had non-zero exports in all the years of the data, and compare them with the corresponding estimates in Table 4 . We observe that the square panel IV-Poisson coefficient estimates for β in Table 5 are systematically smaller than the comparable estimates in Table 4: with the OM data the estimate for β is equal to 0.1442 versus 0.1846 (in columns (3) of Table 5 and 4, respectively), with the EL data the same estimate is equal to 0.1190 versus 0.1644 (in columns (6) of Table 5 and 4, respectively). This suggests that roughly 22% to 28% of the banking integration effect that we observe can be attributed to state-to-country extensive margin, while the remainder to the intensive margin. We would like to emphasize that the intensive and extensive margins in our state-to-country exports setting would necessarily differ from their firm-to-country counterparts. The state-country level extensive margin that we estimate is potentially a lower bound for the firm-level extensive margin aggregated at the state-level: due to the aggregation scheme used in the FTD data (be it OM or EL), firsttime exports of firms in state i to country j would be subsumed in the intensive margin between states i and j, rather being counted towards the extensive margin as they should. As such, our state-to-country intensive margin estimate is likely to be overstated compared to aggregated firm-level intensive margins between state i and country j.
Poisson regression estimates for capital intensity
Next, to gain further insight, we examine whether the observed effect of bank integration on foreign exports to domestic shipments ratio varies by types of industry categories. For this analysis we turn to the SIC-level data and aggregate trade flows and domestic shipments by different industry types.
In Table 6 we present the results of the estimation for capital intensive and non-intensive industries. Capital intensity is defined as the fraction of gross operating surplus (remuneration of capital)
to total value added in the industry, and measured for 1991, the year preceding the start of our sample, for the entire U.S. in a given sector. Industries that were in the upper 50% are labeled as capital intensive, and flows and shipment data was aggregated for these industries. The same procedure is performed for the industries with capital intensity lower than the median.
The results shown in Table 6 are interesting and at first may appear puzzling. We observe -both for the OM and the EL data -that the estimate of β for L1.ln (BANK_INTEGRATION i,t ) is positive and statistically significant for capital non-intensive industries (column 2 and 4 for the OM and the EL data respectively) while it is negative (albeit not statistically significant) for the capital intensive industries (column 1 and 3 for the OM and EL data respectively). For non-capital intensive industries, we obtain a result that a 1% increase in banking integration would increase the ratio of foreign to domestic shipments by 0.168%. How can we interpret these findings? The dependent variable is a ratio of exports to domestic shipments. It may be that -for capital intensive industries -the domestic shipments increased faster than exports as more capital and trade services were provided by integrating banks. For industries where capital was not an important factor of production and hence the domestic supply of it for production was not a vital constraint -i.e. the capital non-intensive sectors -banking integration could have a stronger effect as it were trade related barriers that would be removed once integration took place.
We are in the process of extending our analysis to different sub-sectors (for example, sectors that are more dependent on external finance, those in which there is high asset tangibility, etc., as in ) to corroborate and refine the findings of this sub-section.
Conclusions and Forthcoming Extensions
In this paper, we use a careful IV-based identification strategy and find that a 1% increase in banking integration between U.S. states caused a 0.164-0.184% increase in the exports/domestic shipments ratio for U.S. state-level exports in the years 1992-1996. This increase in openness can be attributed to an increase in capital to cover variable and fixed export costs relative to domestic shipping costs and a higher provision of trade finance services. The extensive margin of trade accounts for at least 22% to 28% of the banking integration effect on the openness ratio.
In further work, we wish to extend our analysis to sector-level data (at the 2-digit SIC code level)
to test whether financial integration affects certain manufacturing sectors more than others: durable versus non-durable goods, more or less external finance-dependent sectors, sectors with higher or lower asset tangibility, etc. We would like also to disentangle the role of trade-specific finance from a more general increase in the availability of finance, the two channels through which bank integration theoretically affects exports (as in Section 3). For this purpose, we are in the process of obtaining a detailed list of trade-finance specialist banks from the U.S. Exim Bank through the U.S. "Freedom of Information Act".
Banks that do not specialize in trade-related services and that enter a state may not have more international expertise than the local ones. In contrats, if a bank that specializes in trade finance expands into the same state, the effect on the latter's exports may be much higher. (BANK_INTEGRATION) ), for which the instruments are the square-root of years since first inter-state banking deregulation lagged two-years (L2.SQRT(YEARS_OPEN)) and an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if a state opens its banking market to one or more states in a given year, and zero otherwise, lagged by one year (L1.D_OPEN). All regressions include (i) origin (U.S.) state-country pair, (ii) year, and (iii) year-and-country of destination fixed-effects. The null hypothesis for the underidentification test is that the matrix of reduced form coefficients has rank k-1 (i.e., under-indentified). The null hypothesis for the weak-identification test is that the equation is weakly identified. The null hypothesis for the over-identification test is that all instruments are valid instruments (i.e., uncorrelated with the error term) and that the instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. Standard-errors and identification tests account for clustering of observations at the origin statedestination country level. t-stats are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
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Within Estimator This table presents the estimates of the gravity equation models with the full sample (including zero exports for state-country pairs when they occur) of the Origin of Movement (OM) and Exporter Location (EL) data. The dependent variable is the foreign exports to domestic shipments ratio (FEXPORTS/DSHIPMENTS). The explanatory variables are the log of destination country's GDP adjusted by international-PPP (ln(DESTINATION_GDP)); the log of distance between U.S. state and foreign country capitals in kilometers (ln(DISTANCE)); an indicator variable (D_FTA) that equals one if there is a free trade agreement between the U.S. and country of destination, and zero otherwise; and an indicator variable (D_CLS_LIMITS) that equals one if the U.S. ExIm bank puts restrictions on the destination country loans or loan guarantees, and zero otherwise. The instrumented endogenous variable is the log of bank integration variable lagged by one year (L1.ln(BANK_INTEGRATION)), for which the instruments are the square-root of years since first inter-state banking deregulation lagged twoyears (L2.SQRT(YEARS_OPEN)) and an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if a state opens its banking market to one or more states in a given year, and zero otherwise, lagged by one year (L1.D_OPEN). Fixed-effects, which vary between regressions, are listed below. In all regressions the standard-errors account for clustering of observations at the origin state-destination country level. t-stats are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. This table presents the estimates of the gravity equation models with the square panel (only state-country pairs with non-zero exports in all years) of the Origin of Movement (OM) and Exporter Location (EL) data. The dependent variable is the foreign exports to domestic shipments ratio (FEXPORTS/DSHIPMENTS). The explanatory variables are the log of destination country's GDP adjusted by international-PPP (ln(DESTINATION_GDP)); the log of distance between U.S. state and foreign country capitals in kilometers (ln(DISTANCE)); an indicator variable (D_FTA) that equals one if there is a free trade agreement between the U.S. and country of destination, and zero otherwise; and an indicator variable (D_CLS_LIMITS) that equals one if the U.S. ExIm bank puts restrictions on the destination country loans or loan guarantees, and zero otherwise. The instrumented endogenous variable is the log of bank integration variable lagged by one year (L1.ln(BANK_INTEGRATION)), for which the instruments are the square-root of years since first inter-state banking deregulation lagged twoyears (L2.SQRT(YEARS_OPEN)) and an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if a state opens its banking market to one or more states in a given year, and zero otherwise, lagged by one year (L1.D_OPEN). Fixed-effects, which vary between regressions, are listed below. In all regressions the standard-errors account for clustering of observations at the origin state-destination country level. t-stats are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The figure depicts the statistics of the number of years state-country destinations pairs observed exports for the OM and the EL data respectively.
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